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There are many factors, which play a vital role in the financing decisions of firms, and one of
the important factors is corporate political strategies. This study examines the impact of corporate
political strategies on the cost of debt of non-financial firms listed in the Pakistan Stock Exchange
(PSX). Corporate political strategies are measured through political connections. We use panel data
of 250 firms from 2001 to 2018. Panel regression is applied to analyze the results. This study finds
corporate political strategies negatively affect the cost of debt. This study provides useful policy
implications for corporate stakeholders to know the importance of political connections while making
the financing decision.
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JEL Classification: G30, G38

Introduction
The firms’ decision-making process may be
affected by the government policies and firms
try to develop connections with government officials for taking the benefits. Firms having connections with politicians retain updated knowledge about changes in government policies,
reforms, tax rebates, and other shared resources
which lead to providing opportunities for easy
access to finance at low cost. In this perspective firms used corporate political strategies for
their benefits. These strategies may be lobbying,
contributing to the campaign, and engage the
politicians in their board of directors for serve
(Colak, Durnev, & Qian, 2017). Politically connected firms gain the favor, which enhances the

company’s economic growth. Political connections provide firms with different types of institutional support in the form of access to internal information and other valuable resources.
These resources play an important role to get a
competitive advantage in the market (Hassan &
van Lent, 2016). Antia et al. (2013) explained
that politically connected firms get more information about government policies to obtain
the maximum benefit from internal information. Al-Hadi, Habib, Al-Yahyaee, & Eulaiwi,
(2017) conducted a study on Brazil and found
that the politically connected firms have a positive impact on its performance and can easily
obtain external finance.
This study has contributed to the previous
body of knowledge by providing evidence on

* Corresponding author’s email: farhan.mba2013@gmail.com
85
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2020

1

The Indonesian Capital Market Review, Vol. 12, No. 2 [2020], Art. 2
A. Amanat, A. I. Hunjra, and F. Ahmed / Indonesian Capital Market Review 12 (2020) 85-92

the relationship of corporate political strategies
and the cost of debt from an emerging market
such as Pakistan. Only a small number of studies have investigated the cost of debt and corporate political strategies up to the knowledge
of the researcher. In those studies, controversial
findings were explored so those inconclusive
results instigate the researcher, to conduct research and found the relationship of corporate
political strategies and the cost of debt in Pakistan.
Jiang & Kim (2015) explained that political
agents act on behalf of other officials. Firms
try to create connections with political hubs or
government officials by using different tactics
(Manos, Murinde & Green, 2007). Getz et al.
(2002) found that the firms reduce the agency
problems that the manager (agent) creates a
relationship with government officials which
reduces the cost of external financing (Li &
Zhou, 2015). There is immense literature that
provides evidence about the benefits of corporate political strategies (Faccio, Masulis & McConnell, 2006). Prior studies provide evidence
on the relationship between corporate political
strategies and the cost of debt. Cooper Gulen
& Ovtchinnikov (2010) argued that there is a
potential link between the political ties of firms
and the cost of debt.
The objective of this study is to find the
impact of corporate political strategies on the
cost of debt. This study provides insights into
the Pakistani setting. Pakistan is a low growth
economy, limited state-owned firms, and weak
democratic which seems vulnerable to the influence of corporate political strategies. A large
number of agriculture allied firms and few other
non-financial firms are politically connected but
there are no legal restrictions (Rehman, 2006).
The findings of the current study provide useful
policy implications for corporate stakeholders
to know the importance of political connections
while making the financing decision.
The remaining part of our study is structured
as follows. We provide brief literate in Section
2. Section 3 describes methodology and data,
followed by empirical findings in Section 4.
However, Section 5 concludes the study with
some insights for future research.
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Literature Review
Political connections help firms to easily access bank loans, and the cost of debt and avoid
market failures (Khwaja & Mian, 2005). Faccio
et al. (2006) explained that the firm is politically
connected when its director, a large shareholder or another member of top management is a
minister, part of the government as a parliament
member or close relative to the head of state.
Faccio et al. (2006) stat that the connected firms
take benefits in the form of easy access to finance, government provide tax shield, contracts
from the government on a preferential basis,
and easy access to credit of state-owned banks.
It also stated that firms having connections with
government officials also obtain an advantage
in the form of exemption in tax through regulations or create hurdles through tax regulations
for their rivals.
Tullock (1967) views rent-seeking theory
helps firms to obtain rare resources such as lower tax rates and other subsidies from the government. Rent-seeking appears to gain substantial
profits due to the change in the economic structure in the transition period, (Chaney, Faccio
& Parsley, 2011). According to Bertrand et al.
(2004), the political connection is a rent-seeking behavior for firms. Besides, by following
the resource-based view Wernerfelt (1984), that
independent directors are instruments providing
facilities to firms to access critical resources.
Based on these theories and perspectives, the
political connection is a competitive advantage
for the firms.
Khwaja & Mian (2005) suggested that politically connected firms get easy access to finance and loan with low-interest rates. They
also found that politically connected firms obtain external finance on a preferential basis and
it reduces the firms’ cost of financing. Chivatxaranukul & Griffin (2001) found that the firms
connected politically obtain the long term loan
easily from the banks and other financial institutions. As political connections are similar to
the collateral for banks and politically connected firms obtain the benefit in the form of a preferential loan. Claessens et al. (2008) explored
that the firms obtain external finance easily
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when they contribute in the election to the winning party. Therefore, the winning party supports the firm in obtaining a loan which shows
that connections play a vital role in easy access
to finance. Firms try to build relationships with
the government to obtain loans and easy access
to finance. Most of the time connected firms get
a preferential loan from state-owned banks due
to a strong tie with the government (Shi, Xu &
Zhang, 2018). Claessens et al. (2008) explored
that corporate political strategies are an important source to obtain easy access to finance.
Boubakri, Guedhami, Mishra & Saffar (2012)
found that firms having connections can easily
access finance, reduction in tax liability, and
other bailout packages from the government.
Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee (2006) conducted
a study in Indonesia and found that politically
connected firms obtain finance at a low cost.
Several other studies also supported the same
results in Taiwan, Brazil, and the USA (Chaney
et al., 2011; Claessens et al., 2008; Houston,
Jiang & Lin, 2011). Bliss & Gul (2012) conducted a study in Malaysia and found that politically connected firms pay the high cost on
loans and other external financings. Johnson &
Mitton (2003) show that political ties impact
the loan amounts that means the political connections are useful for firms to access the debt.
Literature reports that politically connected
firms enjoy special leverage to obtain the government loans and are likely to use more external finance (Ebrahim, Girma, Shah & Williams,
2014; Saeed, Belghitar & Clark, 2016). Literature provides evidence that loan providers accept low interest on their investment as they
think that politically connected directors provide resourcing roles while sharing knowledge
in finance, law, policy-making and serving in
boards of other firms. Based on the above discussion, we develop the following hypothesis:
H1: Corporate political strategies negatively affect the cost of debt of the firm.
We use a set of control variables, i.e., size,
profitability, growth and capital intensity in
our study to strengthen the analysis. Previous
studies provide insights on the importance of

mentioned control variables on the cost of debt.
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) conclude that
large-sized firms bear a low cost of debt and
cost of equity. Chkir et al. (2019) document a
negative relationship between firm size and the
cost of debt. Chaney et al. (2011) provide an
inverse impact of growth on the cost of debt. An
increase in profitability leads to decrease in indebtedness (Vintila et al., 2019). This decrease
in debt financing shows that firms have to bear
less cost of debt due to an increase in profitability. Chivatxaranukul & Griffin (2001) and
Cortez and Susanto (2012) and obtain a negative impact of profitability on debts. Capital
intensity shows the inverse impact on the cost
of debt. As a result of the high capital intensity
ratio, the firm’s cost of capital is reduced Chkir
et al. (2019). Kullu and Raymar (2018) also
provide a negative relationship between capital
intensity ratio and the cost of capital.

Methodology
Data
The sample of this study consists of non-financial firms listed at Pakistan Stock Exchange
(PSX), Pakistan. Eighteen years of panel data
of 250 non-financial firms ranging from 2001
-2018. The data is collected from DataStream,
Financial statements, and the election commission of Pakistan. We obtain the data of corporate political strategies of firms from the election commission of Pakistan which provides all
information about candidates’ contests. In this
study four general elections’ data included for
analysis held in 2002, 2008, 2013, and 2018.
After the deletion of missing data of different
firms, our final sample comprises 250 non-financial firms listed in the Pakistan Stock Exchange with 4500 firm-year observations. We
divided our sample into two groups; politically
connected firms and non-connected firms so we
use a sample of politically connected firms with
1602 observations to check the impact of corporate political strategies on the cost of debt.
Politically connected firms are also divided into
two subgroups; Agriculture allied connected
firms and other non-financial firms. The ob87
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Table 1. The Description of Variables
Variables

ABBV

Cost of Debt

Kd

Corporate political
strategies
Size
Profitability
Growth
Capital intensity

CPS
SZ

Description
References
Interest expenses of a company divided by the total debt (Long Bliss & Gul (2012), Liedong & Rajwani
term and short term debt)
(2018), Qiu & Yu (2009)
When the firms connected it assigned 1 and otherwise 0

Shi et al. (2018), Wang (2015)

Calculate by using the natural log of total assets

Bliss & Gul (2012)
Boubakri et al. (2012), Fan, MengRui &
PRF Earnings before interest and tax to total assets
MengxinZhao (2008), (Chaney et al., 2011)
Calculated by using sales in time t minus t-1 and divided by sales Petersen & Rajan (1994), Pittman and
GRW
of t-1
Fortin (2004), Chaney et al. (2011)
Measured through the gross property, plant, and equipment scale
CINT
Saeed et al. (2016), Boubakri et al. (2012)
by total assets

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Kd
CPS
GRW
SZ
PRF
CINT
Obs.

Mean
0.069
1.000
0.138
7.004
0.029
0.527

Full Sample
SD
Min
0.046
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.920
-1.576
0.775
5.729
0.041
-0.066
0.130
0.275
1602

Max
0.454
1.000
1.891
8.680
0.114
0.756

Mean
0.070
1.000
0.199
7.038
0.031
0.537

Agriculture Allied
SD
Min
0.042
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.806
-1.576
0.681
5.729
0.035
-0.066
0.114
0.275
1026

Max
0.454
1.000
1.891
8.680
0.114
0.756

Mean
0.068
1.000
0.073
6.953
0.026
0.517

Other Non-Financial
SD
Min
0.049
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.947
-1.576
0.801
5.729
0.042
-0.066
0.133
0.275
576

Max
0.454
1.000
1.891
8.680
0.114
0.755

Note: Kd is the cost of debt, CPS is corporate political strategies, GRW is the growth, SZ is firm size, PRF is profitability, CINT is capital
intensity, Med is median, Min is minimum, Max is maximum and Obv is observations

servations used for the analysis of agriculture
allied firms are 1026 and other non-financial
firms are 576. We exclude the firms having
missing values or dissolved during the analysis period. Furthermore, we divide the sample
into two groups of business group affiliated and
non-business group affiliation to check their
impact on the cost of debt.
Statistics
A firm is politically connected if its director
or CEO participated in an election of the national assembly or Provincial assembly. We use a
dummy variable for a politically connected firm
by taking the value of one if at least one director
or CEO is politically connected and otherwise
zero (Khwaja & Mian, 2005; Faccio, 2006). The
cost of debt (Kd) is measured through the interest expenses of the firms divided by total debt
during the year (Bliss & Gul, 2012). We use
firm size, growth, profitability, capital intensity
as control variables in our study. The size of the
firm measured by the natural log of total assets,
earnings before interest and tax to total assets
used as a proxy of profitability, Capital Intensity is measured through gross property, plant,
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and equipment scale by total assets, and growth
are the control variables. We use the following
model for hypothesis testing.
Kdit = α0+β1CPSit+β2GRWit+β3SZit+β4PRFit+β5
CINTit+μit
(1)
		
Whereas Kd is the cost of debt, CPS is corporate political strategies, GRW is the growth,
SZ is firm size, PRF is profitability, CINT is
capital intensity, α0 is constant, µ is an error
term, i is firm and t is the period
We use Gretl software to analyze the data.
We apply descriptive statistics to check the
characteristics of data, correlation is used to
measure the association between variables and
to check the multicollinearity issue. We selected the fixed effect model based on the Hausman
test results.

Results and Discussion
The results of the descriptive statistics in Table 2 show the characteristics of the variables
used in this study. The mean of the cost of debt
of overall sample, agriculture allied and other
non-financial connected firms show that firms
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix
Kd
1
-0.022
0.261
0.064**
0.308**
0.141*

Kd
CPS
GRW
SZ
PRF
CINT

CPS
1
0.026**
0.096*
0.014**
0.058**

GRW

SZ

1
0.644*
0.263
0.105**

1
0.295**
0.097*

PRF

CINT

1
0.123**

1

Note: Kd is the cost of debt, CPS is corporate political strategies, GRW is the growth, SZ is firm size, PRF is profitability and CINT is capital
intensity, ***, **, * are the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively

Table 4. Regression Analysis (DV: Kd)
Variables
CPS
GRW

Overall Sample
-0.169***
(0.043)
-0.359
(0.072)

Agriculture Allied
-0.071***
(0.031)
-0.047
(0.029)

Other Non-Financial
0.120***
(0.026)
-0.101***
(0.034)

SZ

-0.095**
(0.045)

-0.053**
(0.040)

-0.096**
(0.028)

PRF

-0.140***
(0.019)

-0.094***
(0.019)

-0.053*
(0.029)

CINT

-0.168***
(0.021)

-0.108***
(0.023)

-0.610
(0.082)

Adj. R2
F- Statistic
H- Statistic

0.351
10.725***
7.483***

0.385
11.635***
9.583***

0.331
20.790***
9.741***

Note: ***, **, * are the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, CPS is Corporate Political Strategies, GRW is growth, SZ is firm
size, CINT is capital intensity, PRF is the profitability of the firm and standard error is in parenthesis

pay a consistent return to their loan providers
with small deviation in the values. The mean
value of the growth explains that firms enjoy
growth opportunities in Pakistan. This is because the non-financial sector and Agriculture
Allied sectors play an important role in the development of Pakistan’s economy, therefore,
these sectors find more opportunities to grow
and contribute more to the economy. There
is less variation in size and more consistency
towards spending in total assets. This justifies that firms in Pakistan are keen to survive
and spend more money on increasing total assets that result in generating a more favorable
outcome. Overall positive average profitability
indicates firms in Agriculture allied and non-financial sector of Pakistan is efficiently utilizing
its assets to generate profit. The average value
of capital intensity provides evidence that firms
invest more than half of financing to acquire
tangible fixed assets to generate revenues. The
small variation in the values of capital intensity
shows more consistency of firms to acquire tangible fixed assets.
We present a coefficient correlation in Table

3 which explains the relationship among independent variables. Results show that there is no
high correlation which confirms no multicollinearity issue.
We use fixed effect model based on Hausman test to analyze the results in Table 4. The
results show that corporate political strategies
negatively affect the cost of debt which confirms our hypothesis. It indicates that politically connected firms access external finance
easily. The connection makes easy for the firm
to obtain the loan at a low cost. Findings justify that politically connected firms have more
valuable resources enabling them to get external finances that also include a loan from banks
(Claessens et al., 2008; Khwaja & Mian, 2005).
Politically connected firms get benefits from
favorable policies of the government that also
helps firms to manage lower interest rate on
debts. The result shows that agriculture allied
firms have more connections as compared to
other non-financial firms. Furthermore, we find
that firm size significantly affects the cost of
debt which means larger firms have easy to access external finance because those have more
89
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Table 5. Foreign-Owned v/s Domestic Owned firms and Business Group v/s Non-Business
Group
Variables
CPS*FO

FO
-0.098
(0.037)

CPS*DO
GRW
SZ
PRF
CINT
Adj. R2
F- Statistic
H- Statistic

-0.272
(0.111)
-0.378***
(0.054)
0.212**
(0.183)
-0.193*
(0.063)
0.227
12.590***
4.724***

DO

Variables
CPS*BG

-0.200***
(0.034)
-0.284
(0.266)
-0.237***
(0.048)
-0.086***
(0.021)
-0.179***
(0.022)
0.126
40.198***
10.742***

BG
-0.0520***
(0.0060)

CPS*NBG
GRW
SZ
PRF
CINT
Adj. R2
F- Statistic
H- Statistic

-0.3580***
(0.1270)
-0.1310***
(0.0400)
-0.0561**
(0.0260)
-0.1890***
(0.0200)
0.4310
49.9300***
3.8450***

NBG

-0.240
(0.055)
-0.089
(0.016)
-0.233***
(0.050)
-0.138**
(0.063)
-0.058**
(0.027)
0.492
32.270***
6.548***

Note: ***, **, * are the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, CPS is Corporate Political Strategies, GRW is growth, SZ is firm
size, CINT is capital intensity, PRF is the profitability of the firm, FO is foreign-owned, DO is domestically owned, BG is a business group
and NBG is nonbusiness group

resources and relationships with financial institutions. The negative impact of firm size on the
cost of debt is in line with the findings of Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003). The result indicates
that profitable firms listed in Pakistan raise less
finance through debt. The findings of our study
are consistent with Chivatxaranukul & Griffin
(2001) explain that the profitable firms used
less leverage even tax shelter is associated with
profitability. The findings of our study further
reveal the negative impact of capital intensity
ratio on the cost of capital. Negative influence
follows the results of Kullu and Raymar (2018).
The result of Table 5 shows that foreignowned politically connected firms and the cost
of debt have a negatively insignificant relationship. It shows that foreign-owned firms do not
need to access the leverage so the cost of debt
has an insignificant relationship with foreignowned connected firms. We find that politically connected domestic firms have easy access
to external finance. It shows that connection
makes easy for the firm to obtain the loan at a
low cost. In Pakistan, politicians have an influence in financial institutions because policies
made by the state bank with the consultation
of a member of the national assembly dealing
with trade and commerce. So banks have a lenient policy for domestic firms having connections with politicians. The result also indicates
that the politically connected firms and having
business group affiliation obtain the debt easily.
90
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The firms affiliated with large business groups
can share the repute as a group and thus made
easy to access external finance. It also finds that
the business group has more ability to establish
connections as compared to non-business group
firms. The result shows that the non-political
connected firms with a business group cannot
obtain the debt easily which increases the cost
of debt of non-connected firms. Hassan & van
Lent (2016) find that the firms having political
connections enjoy the easy access to finance
from government banks. Large business groups
have more affiliation with politicians or other
government officials and they are the part of
policymakers. Firms attached to those giants
get more benefits as compared to other nonconnected firms (Tahoun & Vasvari, 2019).

Conclusions
The objective of this study is to investigate
the impact of corporate political strategies on
the cost of debt financing. We find that corporate political strategies negatively affect the
cost of debt. It is also revealed that agriculture
allied firms have more connections than other
non-financial firms listed at Pakistan stock exchange. It means that the fund providers give
the preference to politically connected firms
and easy access to external finance which leads
to maintaining high leverage. The findings of
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this study have important implications for information users, organizations, and regulators.
Our study reveals that the firms having connections received preferential treatment from
the government in the form of a tax shield and
other contracts. Lenders perceived that firms
having connections are more secured and lower
default risk. Therefore, lenders provide the loan
to politically connected firms with a low-interest rate and easy access. Our study has certain
limitations. We took data of non-financial firms,

whereas, the same set of studies can be done
by incorporating data of financial firms and
comparison analysis may also be done in future
research. Future research can be conducted by
using the corporate governance variables such
as CEO duality, ownership structure, board size
and other dimensions. Our study is limited to
Pakistan only; however, incorporating other developing countries for similar study can be the
area of interest for future research.
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